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Syria & Locating Tyranny, Hegemony and Anarchy in 
Contemporary International Law. 
 
Aoife O’Donoghue, Durham University Law School 
 
Abstract: 
Substantive renderings of tyranny, hegemony or anarchy as governance forms within 
international law seldom appear. When invoked, tyranny and anarchy are presented as 
exceptional while hegemony, in accounts often borrowed from international relations 
scholarship, is defined as mundane and a natural explanation of international legal 
governance. This article puts forward substantive accounts of all three – tyranny, anarchy 
and hegemony – and utilises these to understand a single event, the airstrikes against Syria 
after the use of chemical weapons by the Assad Government in 2018. This event is first 
described in detail. The article examines the current use of the three theories in international 
legal theory and considers their substantive content. Next, these three theories are applied 
both singularly and in combination to the events in Syria to demonstrate what can be 
observed about international law through their deployment. This article shows the value of 
understanding the operation of international law through each of these prisms in their 
substantive form but also, and most markedly, what can be understood when all three 
frames are combined to explore a single event. 




Tyranny and anarchy, if mentioned in international legal theory, are confined to descriptive, 
often anxious accounts at times uncritically borrowed from international relations. 
Meanwhile hegemony, though similarly reliant on descriptive accounts, is treated as 
commonplace and natural. Substantive renderings of these three governance forms - 
tyranny and anarchy at the margins of international governance, hegemony as the mundane 
- offer much to those wishing to understand the everyday practice of international law. This 
article puts substantive accounts of all three forward to understand a single event; the strikes 
against Syria following the use of chemical weapons by the Assad Government in 2018. It 
demonstrates their usefulness in understanding the operation of international law and the 
value in observing the three in combination.  
Tyranny and anarchy are treated as exceptional, and save for circumstances of egregious bad 
governance, are all but irrelevant to discussions of international law. Hegemony is the 
opposite, it is a descriptor of the ordinary, an almost mundane and benign operation of 
                                                             
 Professor, Durham University. Thanks to Ruth Houghton, Ntina Tzouvala, Colin Murray and the 
attendees at the ‘Hegemony in the International Order’ Workshop in Rome 2018 for comments on earlier 
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power. These perspectives result in incidental invocations of the three terms with little 
consideration of their substantive content, their relationships with each other or other 
governance types. Tyranny is an extreme of cruelty or avarice, anarchy is rarely more than 
chaos or a system of horizontal power-plays, while hegemony is presented as power being 
concentrated in a functioning, efficient horizontal system. Each invocation both 
underutilises their content and exploits common (mis)understandings. This has potential 
implications for their invocation, singularly or in combination within international law as both 
underutilisation and (mis)understanding) can colour how we perceive events. First, such 
invocations may exclude law from important discourse by suggesting its irrelevance; second, 
by insisting on a single prism (tyranny, anarchy or hegemony) it omits other potential 
explanations. Third, it occludes analysis that offers important insight into events, 
observations on how international operates in certain events, like Syria, and what this means 
for future legal and political development.  
Tyranny and hegemony have established lineages. Both emerged in recognisable forms in 
classical Greece. Tyranny is a consistent motif in governance debates, and while 
authoritarianism, totalitarianism or Bonapartism have from time-to-time supplanted its use, 
its substantial content persists.1 Hegemony, initially a descriptor of military dominance, 
evolved in the 19th Century into a much broader political concept.2 Anarchy emerged during 
the Enlightenment, albeit antecedents such as the Levellers suggest earlier iterations. As 
modern hierarchical political and social institutions emerged, anarchy as a counter-point 
political theory also took shape.3 All three terms offer insights that are both prospective on 
what may be good or bad government and reflect lived experiences. On their own none fully 
articulate the nature of any single international legal event(s). Examining a specific event 
through their combined lens helps both to understand why events occurred, but also some 
of the shortcomings within international legal analysis when it relies – not always overtly but 
nonetheless manifestly - on single political descriptive theories to understand events. 
Looking at tyranny, hegemony and anarchy in tandem reveals more than shoehorning every 
aspect into a single narrative.  
The nature of this article means that there is insufficient space to describe every element of 
tyranny, anarchy and hegemony, and so the introductions to each will set the contours of 
their substantive content alongside their most common invocations. Tyranny, anarchy and 
hegemony are chosen as their invocations in international law often overly rely on 
international relations conceptualisations while under-theorising law’s role. The bombing of 
Syria in April 2018 by the US, UK and France is chosen as a case study for four reasons. First, 
as a recent example of military action, a firm narrative upon the strikes has yet to be formed. 
Second, the use of force in Syria and the broader region over recent years established a 
pattern of action by states which is difficult to classify. Third, the bombing illustrates the 
intermixing of domestic, regional and global debates on the use of force. Fourth, there is a 
strong legality thread to debates that enables an assessment of how tyranny, hegemony and 
anarchy fit within legal analysis. 
The piece begins by describing events in Syria in 2018, followed by a conceptual outline of 
tyranny, hegemony and anarchy (with a brief discussion of the factual existence of each in 
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Syria). Syria is then examined through the combined lens of the three theories to establish 
the multiple instances of law’s operationalisation. The article combines a conceptual analysis 
with an account of the existence of tyranny, hegemony or anarchy in Syria. The article 
demonstrates the utility of looking at international legal events through multiple 
perspectives, both individually and collectively, the value of treating tyranny and anarchy as 
potential avenues of insight into international law and thereby re-evaluates events in Syria 
in April 2018 from an international legal perspective. The article argues that international 
legal analysis should move away from descriptive accounts borrowed from international 
relations scholarship. The rich understanding of law that all three offer moves beyond the 
partial explanations proffered in international relations scholarship, but it is in combination 
that they offer the most to our understanding of events within international law such as Syria 
in 2018. 
 
2 Case Study: Syria, Chemical Weapons and the Use of Force, April 2018  
 
In April 2018 an attack in Douma, Syria, killed over 50 people and injured many more. The 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) investigated the attack and 
found that chemical weapons were used.4 Chemical weapon attacks violate the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and customary international law.5 The first reports of the use of 
chemical weapons in Syria emerged in 2012, but it was not until 2013, after a chemical attack 
in Ghouta, that Security Council Resolution 2118 authorised the OPCW to act.6 A Russian 
initiative, UNSCR 2118 followed both the UK’s failure to get parliamentary approval to join 
with prospective US airstrikes against the Assad regime and a combined US and UK failure 
to get Security Council authorisation for the use of force to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons 
stockpile.7  
OPCW weapons inspectors declared at the end of 2013 that Syria’s official inventory of 
chemical weapons had been destroyed.8 Clearly, Syria held other unofficial stockpiles. Since 
2013, the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) of the OPCW visited Damascus at least 20 
times but were given limited access. The DAT therefore stated that it is, ‘not able to resolve 
all identified gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies in Syria’s declaration.’9 While Syria 
admitted continuing research and development, they denied the deployment of chemical 
weapons. Since 2014, there have been over 100 recorded uses of chemical weapons in 
                                                             
4 Report of The Fact-Finding Mission Regarding The Incident of Alleged Use of Toxic Chemicals as A Weapon in 
Douma, Syrian Arab Republic, On 7 April 2018, 1 March 2019 S/1731/2019, s2.17 available at 
https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/03/s-1731-2019%28e%29.pdf, other reports on 
further chemical attacks https://www.opcw.org/fact-finding-mission 
5 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (and Protocols) (As Amended on 21 
December 2001), 10 October 1980, 1342 UNTS 137, Meron 1996, 238 
6 UN Mission, Final Report, UN Doc. A/68/663–S/2013/735 13 December 2013, Security Council Resolution 2118 
27 September 2013 S/RES/2118 
7 Murray & O’Donoghue (2016), 305 
8OPCW Decision, Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons EC-M-33/DEC.1 27 September 2013 
9 ‘Outcome of Consultations with The Syrian Arab Republic Regarding Its Chemical Weapons Declaration’ EC-
91/DG.23 5 July 2019, https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2019/07/ec91dg23%28e%29.pdf 
  4 
 
Syria.10 The International Committee of the Red Cross outlines the many other violations of 
international humanitarian law ongoing since the beginning of protests against the Assad 
regime as part of the Arab Uprising, the emergence of ISIS, and the widespread humanitarian 
catastrophe that resulted.11 Since 2012, the unfolding events in Syria have become ever more 
complex, and the brevity and narrowness of this synopsis is not intended to present a full 
legal analysis. Rather, it sets a context for understanding what tyranny, hegemony and 
anarchy can tell us about the chemical weapons attack in Douma and the response to it 
within the international legal paradigm. 
 
2.1 US, French and UK Airstrikes following the Douma attack. 
Several states have used force within Syrian territory. Some, such as Russia, have done so at 
the invitation of the Assad regime, while the US, Turkey, UK, France and Iran, amongst 
others, have done so to assist various rebel groups, to attack ISIS, or in response to chemical 
weapon usage.12 In April 2018 the US, UK and France attributed the Douma attack to the 
Assad regime. Russia vetoed Security Council proposals from the US, UK and France to 
establish a body to investigate the attack. These countries likewise vetoed Russian 
proposals.13 On 13 April 2018, the US, France and the UK launched punitive air strikes against 
three military targets in Syria.14  
Russia, Bolivia, Iran and Syria described the US/UK/France attacks as a violation of 
international law and Russia proposed a Security Council resolution condemning it as such. 
This was supported by China and Bolivia, albeit some states that abstained or voted against, 
such as the Netherlands and Sweden, referred to the resolution’s text and its need for 
balance, rather than disagreeing with Russia’s interpretation of events.15 The US 
Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, said that ‘[t]hese strikes were a justified, legitimate and 
proportionate response to the Syrian regime's continued use of chemical weapons on its own 
people’16 but this is not a legal test based within the UN Charter. One of the Trump 
Administration’s arguments came perilousness close to armed reprisals which are entirely 
unlawful.17 In the months following the attack the US published the advice of the Legal 
Counsel with regard to the legality of the airstrikes, however this addressed only US 
domestic law.18 France chose not to publish its legal position, nor did President Macron 
invoke international law in his public statements.19 The UK published part of its Attorney 
                                                             
10 Naqvi 2017, 969 
11 Bernard (2017), 865, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “About the Crisis”, available at: 
https://www.unocha.org/syria 
12 Grey 2018, 108, 238-240, Kleczkowska 2019, 369, Anderson 2013 
13 ‘Security Council fails to adopt three resolutions on chemical weapons use in Syria’ 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/04/1006991 
14 Scharf 2019, 189 
15 Security Council Record 8233rd Meeting, S/PV.8233 14 April 2018, Russian Federation: draft resolution, 14 
April 2018, UN Doc. S/2018/355, Kleczkowska 2019, 374 
16 Ambassador Haley Delivers Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on Chemical Weapons Use in Syria 
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://usun.state.gov/highlights/8366, Kleczkowska 2017–2018, 14  
17 Grey 2018, 160-164 
18 Office of Legal Counsel ‘April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities’ 42 (2018) Opinions 
of the Office of Legal Counsel 
19 ‘Press statement by the President of the French Republic on the intervention of the French armed forces in 
response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria’ 14 April 2018 https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-
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General’s Legal Advice. The UK’s position is based on humanitarian intervention.20 Other 
than the UK only Belgium and Denmark have officially endorsed humanitarian intervention, 
albeit the latter two regarding event in the 1990s.21 The UK’s use of humanitarian 
intervention is a recent departure from its historic practice.22 The test used is as follows:  
i. There is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community 
as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring 
immediate and urgent relief; 
ii. It must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of 
force if lives are to be saved; and 
iii. The proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of 
relief of humanitarian suffering and must be strictly limited in time and in scope 
to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other 
purpose).23 
 
The 2018 test is an update of one proffered in 2013 when the UK Government failed to attain 
Parliamentary approval for strikes against Syria.24 The UK’s Young Constitutional 
Convention, developed after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, is intended to give the UK Parliament 
a vote on the use of force except where immediate action is necessary.25 No Parliamentary 
vote was held prior to the 2018 airstrikes, despite over a week passing between the Douma 
attack and the use of force. Despite having no justification under international law, the EU 
and NATO, as well as Germany, Spain, Canada, Australia and Turkey, welcomed the strikes.26 
Several justifications for the use of force were possible.27 Self-defence could be proposed and 
was invoked in separate uses of force against ISIS in Syria. Given the circumstances it is 
unlikely that events could have come within either the definitions of pre-emptive self-
defence or the unwilling-and-unable doctrine even if they were accepted legal basis for the 
use of force.28 It might have been possible to have a basis for action under Responsibility to 
Protect, through a Security Council resolution, however, Russia’s support for Syria and 
wariness from China following the Libyan Security Council Resolution made that unlikely.29  
                                                             
macron/2018/04/14/press-statement-by-the-president-of-the-french-republic-on-the-intervention-of-the-
french-armed-forces-in-response-to-the-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-syria-1.en 
20 Murray & O’Donoghue 2016, 305 
21 Orford 2003, 138 
22 Murray & O’Donoghue 2016, 305 
23 Prime Minister’s Office ‘Syria action – UK Government Legal Position’ 14 April 2018 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position/syria-action-uk-
government-legal-position 
24 Dominic Grieve, ‘Guidance: Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK Government Legal Position’ (29 
Aug 2013) para 2 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235098/Chemical-weapon-
use-by-Syrian-regime-UK-government-legal-position.pdf 
25 House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee ‘The Role of Parliament  
in the UK Constitution: Authorising the Use of Military Force’ HC 1891, 6 August 2019, Murray & O’Donoghue 
2016, 305 
26 Kleczkowska 2019, 374 
27 Grey 2018, 160-164 
28 Charter of the United Nations (24 Oct 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 51, Dinstein 2017, 222, 322, Grey 2018, 108 
29 Grey 2018, 377 
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3 Tyranny  
 
Tyranny has a long lineage. In classical Greece, tyranny evolved into a governance form 
rooted in two forms of illegitimacy. First, a tyrant comes to power through illegitimate means 
or, second while in office an individual goes beyond their official powers becoming 
illegitimate and a tyrant. Narratives that document Republican Rome’s dissent into Empire 
often focus on locating the exact moment or actor that caused tyranny’s emergence. Was it 
the point at which the Roman Senate became a silent political space, was it the expansion of 
Roman territory beyond Roman justice, was it when the office of dictator was altered beyond 
recognition, when Cicero pronounced that the murder of Julius Caesar was a justified 
tyrannicide, when Augustus cloaked himself in law while placing himself beyond its scope or 
a combination of these events.30 Both classical Greece and Rome remain a constant thread 
of tyrannical theory and while figures such as Dionysius or Caligula are infamous it is rather 
the complex relationship with emergencies, legitimacy and tyrannicide that informs 
contemporary debates.31  
Intellectual accounts of tyranny evolved through the medieval period in the writings of John 
of Salisbury and Bartolus, and into the early modern era through Machiavelli.32 The role of 
Catholic Church was particularly important. First it established that tyranny was not just 
connected to secular rule, that a “global” body such as the Church could be tyrannical at both 
the parish and papal levels.33 Second, it created a new justification for tyrannicide though it 
was contested throughout the period. While John of Salisbury argued tyranny releases 
persons from their oaths and establishes a duty to remove the tyrant, Augustine however 
argued that tyranny was a punishment from God that must be endured and no action to 
remove the tyrant taken. It was the Salisbury position that would go on to have traction in 
both ecclesiastical and political debates.34 As modern constitutionalism evolved, tyranny 
became intrinsically linked to contemporary governance and arguments based in theology 
were replaced with political philosophy and in Bartolus, with law.35 The relationship between 
tyranny and constitutionalism, where the latter is a bulwark against the former, is evident 
the writing of Hobbes, Paine, the Federalists.36 In the contemporary era Arendt, Dahl and 
Strauss, among others, consider the inadequacies of constitutionalism – and particularly 
highly legalised constitutionalism – to prevent tyranny.37 
Tyranny is often discussed in purely descriptive terms. This descriptive version tends toward 
shorthand for avarice, or a form despotism linked to Caligula-style governance. In the 
contemporary era, it is rarely utilised for anything other than the most brutal forms of 
governance. Except in the very worst of circumstances, authoritarian or sovereign 
constitutionalism are preferred monikers. The other regular invocation of tyranny is as the 
                                                             
30 Kalyvas 2007, 412-442, 424-425 
31 Boesche 2010, 34 
32 John of Salisbury 1159, 349 
33 Parsons 1942, 138, 143 
34 Nederman and Campbell 1991, 572, Augustine of Hippo 397, 201 
35 Bartolus 1314, Machiavelli 1531, 10 
36 Paine 1894, 69, Hobbes 1909, 253, Hamilton 1864, 180 
37 Boesche 2010, Paine 1894, 71, Arendt 1951 
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opposite of chaos. This is common in both world government scholarship and to describe 
non-orthodox governance reform.38 This is a conservative narrative where radical reform is 
foreclosed since it would invite chaos. This is observable in Hobbes’ invocation of 
tyrannophobia where deviation from the status quo – even if it is a tyranny - creates 
instability.39  
Normative tyranny is defined by its political and legal illegitimacy, either through the means 
employed to gain office or persistent and egregious ultra vires actions in office.40 The tyrant 
can be an individual, a group or an institution, for instance, the Christian Church during the 
medieval period. It can also include a constitutional state acting tyrannically beyond its 
territory as with the expansion of Roman territory.41 Tyrannies are often silent. The absence 
of contestation is a key attribute and silencing techniques include depoliticization through 
the extension of technocracy, the creation of a governance space absent democracy but 
often employing much legality in form and infrastructure, and gross abuses of power 
including violence and cruelty.42 Tyranny sometimes produces societal benefits, such as the 
absence of war, or the creation of order, but there is always a price paid for those benefits.43 
The ultimate benefits accrue to the tyrant and their cadre. Empire is often close to tyranny; 
states otherwise democratic at home can be tyrannical abroad. As far back as classical 
Greece, the corrupting influence of empire and tyranny on domestic governance were key 
concerns for philosophers.44 Tyrannies are full of law, but they exhibit rule by law rather than 
of law, where law cloaks authoritarian actions in false legitimacy.45 Arbitrary power to create 
and redefine law at will is a key feature, but it is not lawlessness but the absence of the rule 
of law.46 The presence of law is essential however its legitimacy is entirely lacking. As Arendt 
outlines, tyrannies can be entirely bureaucratic, a form of faceless rule by nobody.47 
Tyrannies are often gendered.48 Tyrannies are often violent or the fear of violence is such 
that it becomes a continuous backdrop.49 Scale features strongly, from Cicero through to the 
Federalists and World Government discourse. Geographic distance between the centre and 
periphery creates gaps in justice and silence as those ruled are too distant to hear. For some, 
the impact of competition between minorities and majorities forestalls tyranny since it 
ensures contestation while for others the inevitable negative outcome of majority rule makes 
it, and by implication democracy, tyrannical.50  
Tyranny had fallen out of use in discourse in the 20th Century.51 This is partly due to the rise 
of phrases such as Bonapartism and Caesarism in the 19th Century, but also the emergence 
                                                             
38 Müllerson, 2000, 134–47 
39 Hobbes 1909, 253 
40 Machiavelli 1531, 154 
41 Bartolus outlined 10 characteristics of tyrannical government Bartolus 1314, 16-17 
42 Arendt 1951, 374 
43 de Tocqueville 1835, 254 
44 Only occasionally was the harm caused to those living under empire and tyranny discussed. Lane 2014, 112, 
Paine 1894, 65 
45 Machiavelli 1531, 86 
46 Arendt 2007, 714 
47 Arendt, 1958, 40, Arendt, 2009, 78, this can also be found in others such as Mill 1861 
48 Women in government are inevitably tyrants, their lives should be lived in the private tyrannical sphere, or 
they are the root of tyranny Astell 1996, 17-19 
49 Arendt 1969, 37 -42 
50 Montesquieu 1748) 199-200, Marston 2000, 219 
51 There are of course exceptions to this such as the Struss- Kojève debate, Strauss and Kojève 1961 
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of totalitarianism as a description of all-encompassing governance which collapses the 
private into the public in the 20th Century.52 This shift also occurred due to the reluctance in 
both scholarship and politics to describe any system as no longer possessing a constitutional 
order. This is not limited to extreme cases such as North Korea or failed states but also in the 
emergence of new terms such as authoritarian constitutionalism, illiberal democracy, 
sovereign democracy or advanced democracy.53 The rise of populist discourse and the 
dismantling of liberal constitutionalism have renewed interest in tyranny,54 but there 
remains a reluctance to use tyranny - in contrast to hegemony and anarchy - and rarely is any 
system found to meet either its descriptive or normative description. 
Tyranny’s normative content is relevant to international law.55 International law’s 
relationship with democracy,56 with the rule of law,57 its beneficence towards particular social 
groups,58 its ongoing relationship with colonialism,59 its connection to technocracy and its 
gendered underpinnings suggest that tyranny could be a useful measure for international 
legal critique.60 International law’s relationship with imperialism reached its apex as Western 
states were at their colonial height but the consequences of this nexus remain.61 The 
institutional and legal structures of international law have yet to emerge fully from 
imperialism’s shadow.62 The lack of engagement with tyrannical theory in international law 
mirrors its broader side-lining in governance debates. Nonetheless it has the potential of 
opening a new form of critique that would require deep reflection on the content and 
structure of international law.63 
 
3.1 Tyranny and Syria 
 
Syria’s Government fits the attributes of tyranny. Assad presides over an illegitimate regime 
where benefits accrue to a single group, while claims to the creation of ‘order’ when 
compared with other regional states or the ISIS caliphate are its core benefit. Non-
contestation and rule by law are sustained through violence or its threat. There was a 
relatively stable governance order under Assad with elections, a judiciary and a division of 
power but none of these amounted to constitutionalism. Rather rule by law, with a chimera 
of democracy and a compromised judicial system subsisted for a considerable period. While 
prior to the Arab Spring the epithet of authoritarian constitutionalism could be applied, if 
that existed than a process where an otherwise constitutional order would have had to 
                                                             
52 Baehr and Richter 2004, Arendt 1951, 146, Arendt 2006, 96, for a critique of totalitarianism as a descriptor of 
Nazi Germany and the notion of state-phobia see Foucault 2008, 74-76 
53 Kovács, Kriszta; Tóth, Gábor Attila 2209 
54 Snyder 2017 
55 Koskenniemi 1990, 4, von Bogdandy 2019  
56 Houghton 2019, 465 
57 Krieger, Nolte and Zimmermann 2019 
58 Chimni 1993, 236-237 
59 Anghie 2005 
60 Heathcote 2019 
61 Bento and Ford Rage for Order 2016, Natarajan, Reynolds, Bhatia and Xavier, 2019 
62 Orford 2011 
63 Schwöbel, 2011, Walker 2015 
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become tyrannical over time. The Assad regime never possessed the attributes of 
constitutionalism. As a state, Syria emerged from both the fall of the Ottoman Empire and 
the mandate system under France and, as such, has historically fallen under imperial tyranny. 
ISIS rule would fall under Arendtian totalitarianism in both its governance form and the 
egregious treatment of women and other marginalised groups.64 Syria’s internal governance 
is not the focus of this piece but rather the events following the chemical attack in Duoma 
and international law’s role in states’ responses to it. However, if we are to consider whether 
the removal of a tyranny or regime change is justificatory it becomes relevant. None of the 
three states that attacked based their arguments on regime change and the duty or 
entitlement to engage in tyrannicide lies with those living under tyranny.65 The declaration 
of a state to be a tyranny does not strip it of statehood, rather it recognises that 
constitutionalism is not synonymous with statehood.  
Turning to the bombing campaign, the UK Government took the decision to use force 
despite the emergence of the Young Constitutional Convention under which the UK 
Parliament should vote on uses of force except in emergencies. In this instance, no prior vote 
was offered. This raises questions of constitutionality, albeit it would be difficult to argue the 
UK is an a-constitutional order. It is, as previously described, possible for a domestically 
constitutional order to act tyrannically abroad. The UK’s domestic constitutionality does not 
provide a justification for an illegal use of force.66 The combination of acting on the basis of 
rule by law and the utilisation of force at the periphery – an analysis that could be extended 
to both France and the US who also faced domestic constitutional issues - raises the 
possibility that all three states were acting tyrannical beyond their borders. 
The UK was the only state to give a formal international legal justification for the bombing. 
The UK’s Attorney General’s legal advice builds upon previous iterations which had not 
convinced an earlier Parliament as to the legality of humanitarian intervention in Syria. By 
placing reliance on humanitarian intervention as opposed to the UN Charter and using force 
in the absence of a Parliamentary vote, despite the Young Constitutional Convention, the UK 
appears to be moving away from the governance order of which it is a co-creator and firm 
member of as one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Neither the US 
nor France released their legal justifications, and the US’ only published advice focused 
entirely on domestic decision making. All three states failed to inform the UN Security 
Council of their justifications for their use of force before undertaking action, preferring 
public statements which conferred little legal legitimacy. Their approach suggests either that 
they consider themselves to be above any existing international rule of law system or 
demonstrates that the system is nearer to an international rule by law order regarding the 
use of force. This is not the absence of law. As under a tyranny, law is plentiful, but it operates 
at the whim of those in power. 
Russia’s role in Syria is different. Outwardly, Russia is acting within the legal bounds of 
international law as they have been invited by the Syrian Government to use force. Further, 
the Duma in Moscow supports the use of force.67 Nonetheless, if we consider Russia’s 
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engagement with a tyrannical regime in Syria, its obstinate dealings with the OPCW and its 
own potential violations of international humanitarian law in its Syria intervention, it is 
possible to characterise Russia’s international actions as tyrannical.68 Whether the Putin 
regime is itself tyrannical is beyond this paper but certainly it is one of the states that has 
consistently called for a ‘redefinition’ of democracy and constitutionalism to extend rule by 
law and authoritarianism.69 
Where does the benefit lie, and could the bombings be benevolent? If we begin with 
benevolence, the UK action framed its bombing as humanitarian intervention which presents 
itself as benefiting a population however outside the parameters of Responsibility to Protect 
where there are duties regarding the types of force used.70 As the Security Council 
sanctioned action in Libya demonstrates, in practice this doctrine is limited.71 Whether the 
general population of Syria benefited from the airstrikes is debatable. While there were 
military targets and no reports of civilian casualties, it is far from evident that the strikes 
prevented the Assad regime from further use of chemical weapons or other violations of the 
laws of war or that they will bring the civil war to a swifter conclusion. The US already had 
special forces fighting ISIS forces within Syrian territory and both France and the UK had 
engaged in bombing campaigns against them in Iraq however the justifications for those 
uses of force are entirely separate to Douma and this attack does not appear to be 
differentiated from the bombings.  
Who benefited? The political benefits that flowed to the three states involved in the airstrike 
both domestically and internationally are hard to quantify, particularly if damage was also 
done to their legitimacy. Similarly, the benefits that were gained by either Syria or Russia 
from portraying themselves as victims of states engaged in ignoring the lack of evidence of 
attribution for the chemical weapons attacks and international law is equally difficult to 
quantify. There is also the use of force as a form of violence in and of itself. Violence as an 
element of tyranny is not essential, but the threat of violence often features. The threat of 
the use of force or violence without the constraint of law or the due process of sorts, that the 
Security Council or other international legal mechanisms offer, certainly cleaves close to 
tyrannical actions. Not every attribute of tyranny is present, but this does not mean that such 
actions are not tyrannical. Rather the question is whether the actions were, in practice, 




Herodotus first described hegemony as the political and military dominance of one state over 
others within a league of states.72 Hegemony has since moved beyond the narrow confines 
of city states to the global arena and into international law.73 As hegemony evolved it came 
to embody a theory that goes beyond raw power to include social, cultural and economic 
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domination.74 Hegemony breaks through the Grotian state as a method to understand inter-
state, transnational, regional and global dominance. Global hegemony or the predominance, 
control or undue influence of one entity or group of entities over others is not established as 
core to the international legal debate as it tends to emphasise Westphalian sovereign state 
equality which a hegemonic account contest. Nonetheless, a form of international relations 
hegemonic theory has come to dominate international legal discourse.75 
A hegemon’s ideas and practices are the default and so entrenched in discourse that 
dislodging them and establishing new ideas becomes difficult. Gramsci regarded hegemony 
as based both on dominance and consensus.76 Hegemony extends beyond traditional ideas 
of dominance through threat or use of force to establish dominance. Hegemonic dominance 
includes pre-dominance, control and undue influence and is related to consent, coercion and 
socialisation. Force may maintain or establish dominance – military or political – but more 
often hegemony is achieved through intellectual and moral leadership (force often remains 
a potent aspect of a hegemon’s artifice). For Gramsci, hegemony is part of class rule that 
operates beyond states boundaries.77 To embed and persist predominance requires both the 
consent of civil society and its expansive engagement. In Gramsci’s view hegemony required 
a core around which the system’s ideology operates and a common world view revolves. In 
the work of Cutler and Gill alongside other neo-Gramscian critical scholars this is the basis on 
which the intersection of institutions, ideologies, capitalism and class establishes 
hegemony.78 Hegemons are often presented as singular, however they can be a heterarchy 
including networked systems, concerts, alliances and coalitions where the hegemon does 
not necessarily dominate the entire international system but rather its own sphere of 
influence.79  As with tyranny, for some, hegemony can be positive if it creates stability and 
order. For others, the tools necessary to establish and maintain hegemony (including 
inequality and social, economic and physical harm) are little more than gratuitous uses of 
power, whatever benefits some might perceive.80 Often it is at the core, where the hegemons 
are, that the stability and thus benefits are felt. Hegemony rarely is considered to create 
global stability and relies on instability at the peripheries to subsist, as such, who benefits 
from the system is limited to the hegemons and those at the core. 
Countering hegemony is difficult but possible.81 Contestation can involve a frontal attack on 
the predominant ideas, or engaging with or subverting those ideas to bring about their 
overturn and replacement.82 It is in understanding and employing these methods in 
combination that Gramsci argued capitalism, and other hegemonic forms, could be toppled. 
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For all of the significance of Gramsci’s theory, his substantive description of hegemony rarely 
forms the basis of international legal critique.83 
At the academic intersection between international relations and law there is no agreed 
definition of hegemony, but international legal scholarship, with few exceptions, rarely 
departs from the descriptive account offered by non-critical international relations 
scholarship.84 Doyle argues that hegemony is the ‘controlling leadership of the international 
system as a whole’, while Ilkenberry and Kupchan suggests that it establishes ‘a set of norms 
that others willingly embrace.’85 Counter-hegemony, hegemonic stability and instability are 
given considerable attention as have questions of consent, coercion and the socialisation 
process by which hegemonic norms are established but international law rarely reflects on 
how this impacts on structures that support its own operation.86  
Within international relations the dominant narratives focus on state or state networks of 
domination. These accounts centre upon force, with economic, social and cultural elements 
taking only supporting roles. Hegemonic stability theory, often associated with Kissinger and 
his treatise on Metternich, provides the traditional explanation of the US’s role in 
maintaining international security as a successor to the Pax Britannia or even Pax Romana.87 
This stability narrative often ignores the instability that arises at peripheries which seldom, 
if ever, get the ‘benefits’ of the hegemon. Within such a hegemony law is important in 
establishing systems, but it is rarely more than a tool. Grewe argues that successive 
hegemons established the foundations of international law, facilitating subsequent neat 
descriptions of international law’s evolution.88 European attempts to establish hegemony 
over America, Asia and Africa from the 15th Century to the first half of the 20th Century 
become essential to understanding contemporary international law. Within Europe the 
Vienna Concert system established hegemonic stability.89 Post-World War II the US and 
USSR provided counter-hegemonies until the end of the Cold War. In recent years the rise of 
China has provided a new point of departure, even if China is rarely portrayed as a benign 
hegemon, in the mould of the US or European Concert system.90 The EU presents a new 
challenge which the historical international relations narratives of both the Concert system 
and external European hegemonic forces do not capture. While international law adjusted to 
the twentieth century by regulating overt aggressive uses of force, this shift has not 
displaced hegemony within international relations.91 
These accounts focus on the core of the hegemony with rare discussions of its peripheries, 
their narratives or their legal engagement. Where these are addressed, they are presented 
as imperial expansion as seen from the core.92 They also infrequently consider the counter-
hegemonic practices of feminist activism or anti-colonial revolutions, their impact on 
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international law’s development, instead favouring linear (progressive) narratives that 
overestimate hegemonic power. The critique provided by Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL) also recognises the existence of a hegemon, however the 
consequences are perceived differently.93 Critical scholarship examines the networks and 
class interests that transcend national borders and comes closer to Gramsci’s account of 
cultural hegemony, arguing that that dominant political and economic ideas reflect and are 
to the benefit of the dominant state and class.94 This critique suggests that hegemonic 
influence establishes what for some may be positive norms but for most others is an 
unjustified imposition of Euro-American exceptionalism.95  
Krisch argues that hegemons typically instrumentalise law, reshape into a hierarchy and 
supplant it with domestic legal tools that better suit their purposes.96 But Krisch also points 
to a paradox within the international legal order, that to operate it requires power to enforce 
its norms.97 This suggests a very close relationship between international law and hegemony, 
whereby they appear locked together in substance, procedure and structure. The hegemon 
will establish and buttress the global order that best suits its requirements through both 
coercion and acquiescence, and this narrative reoccurs as differing hegemons assert 
themselves within international law.98 This recognises both the role and use of law within 
and by hegemons and its import within the international legal order. 
Gramsci emphasised the complicated ways in which cultural hegemony reproduces 
capitalism and the role of ideology in determining what becomes common sense.99 The 
neoliberal scholarship of Mises and Hayek, establishing what is ‘common sense’ and utilising 
law to create a global neoliberal capital system, reflects Gramsci’s descriptions, much as he 
would not agree with their worldview, and provides a good example of his theory in action. 
Over an extended period, neoliberal economic scholars replaced the welfare narratives of 
Keynesian economics within regional and international economic institutions with 
neoliberalism market oriented legal structures and enforcement.100 Unlike international 
relations approaches, substantive hegemonic theory moves beyond the inter-state or 
Concert analysis and places law in a more active role. It argues that the tools of technocratic, 
social and political elites are apparent within international law, as such, when international 
law is presented as universal this is unreflective of reality as in fact it is particular.101 
Gramscian hegemonic contestation argues that the political use of legality to establish a 
regime of benefit to an actor or set of actors is evident. For neoliberal theorists this was quite 
apparent.102 Often, but not always linked to globalisation, contemporary scholarship on 
hegemony recognises that actors beyond states may also be sources of hegemonic power.103  
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Hegemony occurs within, amongst, and between states and while most often hierarchical, it 
can assume heterarchical form where networks of states or interest groups become 
hegemons.104 Networks of states, agents of states such as international organisations, non-
state elites, multinationals and civil society operate within and beyond the state. Law is often 
the instrument used by these groups. Hegemony may involve military, political, social, 
cultural, economic and technocratic practices, alongside legal practices where the dominant 
narrative of what the law ought to be is seldom contested.  
Hegemony includes pre-dominance and control with consent, coercion and socialisation 
intrinsic to its maintenance. Hegemons do not control everything at all moments, hegemonic 
power can be particular to a system or regime. A system can have multiple hegemons active 
across different sites. The benefits that emerge from hegemony such as stability, peace or 
economic prosperity, however, are confined to the core with instability maintained at the 
peripheries. Law and international law are closely connected, be it in the hegemonic creation 
of law, its enforcement of policy objectives that affirm the hegemon or in the operation of 
rule by law where the hegemon dictates the content of the law. 
 
4.1 Syria and Hegemon 
 
The Assad regime and its power base maintain their power and domination through coercion 
and consent and would qualify as a local hegemon. This does not exclude the tyrannical 
argument already offered but rather switches the frame to provide a different analysis, these 
two will ultimately be combined with anarchy. While force is important, both economic 
power and socialisation had maintained stability in the region where elsewhere instability is 
common, a hegemonic benefit. Recently, however, this power could only be maintained 
through the intervention of outside forces who often utilised international law as a source of 
legitimisation. At first glance it would be difficult to describe the US, France and the UK 
airstrikes as hegemonic action as they were collaborative within their own group, however, 
a different light is cast on the action when only one of the three would be a position to act on 
their own. The US has long been identified as a hegemon, and in 2017 bombed Syria alone.105 
The addition of the UK and France might indicate a troika of hegemons, and their places as 
permanent Security Council members reflects the historic hegemonic international 
institutional and legal structure as it existed in 1945. However, the strikes allude to the 
strength of the US as a – albeit not sole - global hegemon in bringing two others, relatively 
powerful, states along with it, despite the legal ambiguity. 
Other manifestations of hegemony (legal, social and cultural) apply to the actions of these 
three self-identified democratic constitutional states in several ways. First amongst these is 
the technical ability to undertake action from such a distance that risks no lives. The social 
and legal hegemony that enables such lawless action to sidestep Security Council censure 
and even receive a measure of international backing is also important. If the US is the sole 
hegemon, the socialisation which ensures the consent of other states within its penumbra of 
power is essential to its status. The unlawfulness has no legal consequence beyond the social 
and cultural capital that may be affected, and this will be more apparent for the ‘junior’ 
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partners in the action. If we see it as a heterarchical hegemony, then consent from other 
actors which align with the hegemonic will is evident. Behind the social and legal hegemony 
stands the military coercion that supports the ability to undertake the action. 
The US and French executives’ nonproduction of international legal justifications, in contrast 
to the UK, reveals a lack of homogeneity. All three were more concerned with domestic 
audiences rather than international, and this points to a wider trend where gaining domestic 
legal legitimacy has been put in the place of international law, a form of creeping 
unilateralism that sidesteps the UN Charter.106 As Krisch argues, this replaces international 
with domestic regulation. International law operates as the tool of the hegemon where 
acting beyond the law, as per the rule by law, becomes and is the norm. Law then is a useful 
instrument of the hegemon, enforced when a state violates international humanitarian law, 
as in Syria, but not when the hegemon uses force outside of the structures it has set as the 
norm.  
Russia aligning itself with Syria re-enacts the old Russia/US (with France and the UK) dance 
of two hegemonic forces facing off in the context of proxy wars. In supporting - both militarily 
and politically - a state violating international humanitarian law, while purporting to uphold 
the UN Charter, Russia may look like it is taking a different course but in reality, is mirroring 
the US in taking very similar steps of establishing the legal legitimacy of its action. The UN 
Security Council acts as the legal and political instrument of both, it is their touchstone in 
establishing the legal and political legitimacy of their actions and enables both to maintain 
their own hegemonic spaces. In that space the Security Council acts for the hegemons in 
creating a legalised political order that through both coercion and consent calcifies their 
power.  
Russia’s actions and its intervention to prevent an investigation by the OPCW into Douma 
might suggest that a hegemonic explanation is insufficient, and indeed that is the main 
argument of this piece. Russia had to manipulate the political and legal space that it had 
partially created to prevent the emergence of facts that would destabilise the legitimacy of 
its own actions in Syria. Hegemons do not have to control all things at all moments. The 
activities of multiple hegemons across multiple sites is evident. Hegemonic stability is less 
apparent in this multi-sited discourse, and along with it the benefits that some insist it 
obtains. Hegemonic stability, however, insofar as it exists, most often leads to instability at 
the periphery. The October 2019 decision by the US to abandon its alliance with the Kurds of 
Northern Syria is clear example of when a decision at the core causes chaos at the periphery. 
A tweet in Washington can cause untold misery for those living far away from the source of 
power because that power has made a decision, the consequences of which do not trouble 
the benefits accrued at the core.107 These events in Syria demonstrate both that a hegemon’s 
power is finite, in that Russia had to block a legal step in a system it is a fundamental part of 
and that hegemonic theory, as it is traditionally presented in international relations theory, 
is finite in what it can explain about the operation of international law. 
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Anarchy is offered in two forms: as a boogieman to be feared or as the underlying reality of 
international relations. In the former guise anarchy requires intervention to prevent 
lawlessness and chaos, a clarion call to any lawyer. In the latter anarchy reflects international 
relations as they are where international law operates, at best, as guidelines. Within 
international law anarchy is influential, but rarely directly addressed. Hedley Bull’s book The 
Anarchical Society is prominent and the touchstone for international legal discourses seeking 
to prove international law’s substance and import when faced with international relations 
accounts of its ineffectiveness. 108 Anarchy in its second type involves chaos, lawlessness and 
disorder. This emerges in two forms; first “total” anarchy, the outcome of a failed world 
government and, second, the world established in the absence of law. This absence narrative 
is apparent in 19th Century discourses on civilisation. These are reproduced in the 21st Century 
in the extension of technocratic forms which aim to bring certainty into governance by 
removing politics from decision-making.109 Anarchy’s substantive form as political 
philosophy is rarely considered worth international law’s attention.110  
Anarchism does not offer a single vision of a society, but traces of it can be found in 
libertarianism, communism and republicanism.111 Anarchy, or the absence or rejection of 
centralised authority, offers far more than chaos. Kant placed anarchy alongside despotism, 
barbarism and republicanism as one of four forms of government, describing anarchy as law 
and freedom without force.112 Anarchy, like hegemony and tyranny, has antecedents in the 
classical period where anarchy held both the utopian ideal of a non-hierarchical society 
alongside connotations closer to chaos.113 Anarchy and lawlessness can be embodied (in the 
negative) Hobbesian or (in the positive) Edenistic states.114 Hobbes’ nasty, brutish and short 
state of nature necessitates strong government and discipline. Edenistic states of nature 
suppose a system where law and order are unnecessary as want and conflict are absent. For 
Kant, anarchies fell short of being full sovereign states, as law was mere recommendation 
not backed by force. This prevailing view of anarchy as not meeting the minimum 
requirement for statehood has had lingering ramifications for international law. In the age of 
imperial expansion, territories closer, or characterised as, closer to substantive anarchy were 
not deemed civilised.115 As Lorimor famously argued ‘Communism and Nihilism are thus 
forbidden by the law of nations.’116The control of the use of force and the role of the Security 
Council permanent five members further underpins the link to a monopoly of force and its 
relationship to legitimate government characterising statehood.117 Those states that possess 
the ultimate control of force inside and beyond their territories are those given the greatest 
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prominence in the UN order. Those that reject force are of little consequence in the system 
and those that cannot exercise a monopoly on force within their borders are, at times, 
deemed failed states.118 
Pierre Joseph Proudhon described anarchy as ‘the absence of a master, of a sovereign’.119 For 
Proudhon anarchies are stateless societies where activities and organisation are undertaken 
by voluntary associations without fear of disorder or chaos.120 While anarchists reject the 
state, intention to create a system where all share in decisions and outcomes forms a central 
tenet of anarchist organisation. Anarchy does not focus on freedom from domination but 
rather on the lack of force to compel individuals to act in particular ways. Anarchism requires 
a refoundation of an entire order not merely a process of reform. Following Proudhon, later 
iterations embraced both collectivism and individualism.121 Collectivism is most often 
connected to radical left politics, while individualism is embraced by libertarianism. Both 
reject states’ monopoly on force, however collectivism regards community and collective 
decision making as essential, whereas libertarianism prioritises individual decision-making.  
Community is an important strand of anarchist theory, which Jean Luc Nancy argues should 
be conceived of as a group of ‘beings in common’; a community not allied by communion but 
rather where individuals recognise the other within the community and individuals are not 
subsumed into a greater whole.122 Community is centred on being in common and, as such, 
individuals do not become subordinate to the sovereign.123 International law might embrace 
the absence of a master or sovereign as definitional, but in the main legal scholars have either 
attempted to disprove this characterisation entirely or to detail how international law is 
evolving away from it.124 Focusing on an absence of government or, in Waltz’s terms, an 
absence of the figure of a higher common sovereign, however, does not correlate with 
Proudhon’s anarchy as the absence of such a figure is irrelevant to his theory.125  
Bull’s Anarchical Society established anarchy within the international order not as Proudhon 
would have envisaged, but as the product of force and power. This brings Bull’s use of the 
term, in some respects, closer to tyranny.126 Bull’s realist view validates international law, but 
only since, as per Kant, it is the recommendation of an international society where there is 
no force to coerce submission. The international society creates international law to stave 
off unrestricted violence.127 This related closely to Bull’s view that inter-state relations exists 
without a sense of community or society until the point at which a shared common interest 
points toward the creation of rules. Hobbes and the anarchic state of nature is especially 
influential within this realist tradition.128 Much like Kant, Hobbes did not see international 
relations as being absent law, but rather that the law of nations was consent based and 
therefore lacked authority.129 For Bull, an international society with common rules and 
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institutions is possible, sustains itself by maintaining a constant state of competition, which 
as with Hobbes, results from human nature.130 In this characterisation international law is 
both a social construct and a product of habit.131 Waltz argues that anarchy within 
international relations allows states the freedom to act as they wish and this enables 
autonomy to flourish.132 This view is predicated on sovereign equality being a reality, rather 
than the presence of a hegemon or tyranny. But hegemonic stability is also invoked as a 
rampart that prevents anarchy if the latter is thought to be closer to Hobbes than to 
Proudhon.133  
In contrast, critical accounts of world government rely on descriptive tyranny and anarchy to 
maintain that a world government would be tyrannical, because anything less would lead to 
anarchy.134 This sets tyranny and anarchy at opposite ends of a hypothetical spectrum. 
Whether anarchy is better than tyranny is rarely articulated. That they are equally bad is 
intimated, albeit for Bull and Waltz anarchy is always present within the international order 
(but not the chaos that emerges from the infeasibility of world government).135 Between 
these extremes is a constructivist approach which places international law at the heart of a 
global order based upon socially constructed rules.136 International law, and specifically the 
international rule of law, supposedly combat excesses in politics ‘understood as a matter of 
furthering subjective desires and leading to an international anarchy.’137 The realm of politics 
is projected as requiring restraint.  
Anarchy as governance, in the substantive Proudhon form, is largely absent from 
international legal theory where it is used as shorthand for chaos or force. Bull’s international 
relations perspective, while not as extreme as Hobbes’, disregards conceptions of this 
political theory resting in voluntary cooperation without the state.138 These conceptions of 
anarchy are critical to the relationship between capitalism, society, technology and culture 
and include strands of anarchfeminism and self-liberalisation.139 Traditional legal orders, 
including systems that foster hierarchy and authority, where theories of crime and 
punishment underpin order and institutionalised structures such as marriage are rejected. In 
their place, a strong focus on individualised direct action is put in place.140 This requires 
individuals to be at the heart of the governance order rather than – as with current 
international law – rarely the subject of law but often its object. 
Substantive anarchy is directly at odds with current international law. Anarchism rejects the 
international legal order both because it is impervious to individualised activism and because 
sovereign equality is no more than an ideal. There is also a strong strand of pacifism within 
anarchism which makes it difficult to reconcile with legalised force under the UN. Instead, 
international law relies upon operationalised coercive forms, often backed by force or 
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economic pressure.141 International law’s intermediaries, including the law-making and 
operationalising structures, are state and institution based. They are coercive and designed 
to prevent direct individualised action.  
Anarchy as a governance theory should be deployed as a principled critique of international 
law’s cost to individual lives, emphasising the need for both resistance and direct action. 
International law, and especially the international rule of law, often characterises politics as 
destabilising good governance. Politics, in this regard, is ‘understood as a matter of 
furthering subjective desires and leading to an international anarchy.’142 Whether 
international law buttresses international rule by law and thus creating the vacuum in which 
chaos breathes is rarely queried.  
Such a critique is not a call for chaos, or for Bull’s state-dominated international society, but 
taking anarchy as governance without domination seriously, in the absence of a master, 
entails the participation of all within a community. Direct action creates a space at odds with 
international law, where procedural sovereign equality marks the absence of a substantive 
equality.143 Here substantive anarchy can reveal possibilities for reform. Anarchy does not 
possess a single idealised governance form. Rather, Proudhon’s account is based on 
heterarchal decision-making, resistance and cooperative governance. It is these elements 
that sets the contours of what anarchy embodies. While anarchy is often lawless, this 
lawlessness is not chaos; it comes from co-operative non-hierarchal decision-making.  
 
5.1 Syria and Anarchy 
 
If anarchy is treated as a theory of chaos, then Syria’s dissent under the Assad regime leaves 
it in one of contemporary international law’s newest categories, the failed state.144 In certain 
periods, comparing the precarity of the Assad Regime against the Montevideo Convention 
criteria on statehood could lead to the conclusion that Syria had descended into anarchy.145 
This raises questions over Syria’s ability to decide the international legal repercussions of 
events. The US characterised it as unwilling and unable to tackle ISIS, arguably a form of 
descriptive anarchy.146 This, the US argued, enabled elements of their multi-part military 
intervention. At the height of the advances by Rebel Groups and ISIS, states raised questions 
about the Syrian Government’s ability to issue an ‘invitation’ to Russia to intervene.147 This 
descriptive account of anarchy works to disempower Syria both as a state and its 
government, no matter that in other circumstances the potentially tyrannical nature of the 
Assad regime was otherwise ignored.  
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The legal wrangling at the UN Security Council suggests a hierarchal structure that may 
appear akin to Bull’s anarchy. International law is used by Russia and the three bombing 
states to end the chaos in Syria within a society that is based on co-operation not law. There 
was clearly co-operation amongst the three states undertaking the airstrikes and 
acquiescence from other states. The billiard ball analogy for international law that often sits 
at the core of international relations scholarship suggests that the internal operations of 
states are immaterial and states only interact where the come into contact with each other 
appears apt to a co-operative inter-state structure where law is of use in a cooperative 
context.148 It might, however, be more fruitful to use substantive anarchy as a point of 
critique rather than attempting to find its operationalisation in the Syria conflict. 
The UK’s predicated the legality of the 2018 bombing on the need for evidence ‘generally 
accepted by the international community as a whole’ of large-scale humanitarian distress 
requiring immediate action.149 This invocation of community ties the idea of liberal peace to 
Bull’s invocation of society.150 A self-declared community of liberal democratic states agree 
when a use of force is needed, thus side-stepping inconvenient established international law. 
The UK test for humanitarian intervention can be conceptualised as Bull anarchy in that it 
refers to a community of states agreeing that action must be taken outside of the structured 
legalised institutional system for the better of the whole.  
The community of states leading a liberal peace, however, does not consider any community 
argument beyond immediate allies, often just Western states. The UK, in coming to its 
decision, consulted with just two states and not its own Parliament. It relied on a conception 
of community within which democratic states - even those choosing to ignore domestic 
constitutional processes - ought to be given more of a ‘say’ on whether force can be used.151 
Thus it refers not to the community of states made up by the United Nations, nor a 
community as Nancy would recognise that is not based upon subjugation, allegiances or self-
identification. The absence of substantive anarchy reveals the problematic operation of 
international law. What remains amounts to hierarchical decision-making, where ‘good’ 
states take the decisions because of domestic constitutional superiority. One community 
retains the power to determine the four corners of decision-making regarding the use of 
force. Community here is a process of othering, of them and of us and nowhere is that 
planner than in the UK’s test for humanitarian intervention. 
Syria was bombed for violating international law; law did not and has not stopped the use of 
chemical weapons. Similarly, international law did not curtail the actions of the US, the UK 
and France, even if the UK still felt it necessary to couch its actions in the legalised language 
of a self-created test, as did the US and France to a lesser extent. Under a traditional 
international relations analysis these strikes demonstrate the non-importance of 
international law and the existence of anarchy. The 2018 bombings do not imply the absence 
of domination, instead they suggest that law’s presence is not an equaliser. It acts to enshrine 
domination at both the domestic and international levels. Substantive anarchy requires 
cooperation in the absence of violence, but the 2018 bombing of Syria is predicated on the 
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ability of some states to use overwhelming force to punish another state’s violation of 
international law with no repercussions for their own actions. Waltz’s “freedom to” within 
international anarchy omits any consideration of “freedom from” the force of a sovereign, 
including that of another state. 
6 Tyranny, Hegemony and Anarchy 
This final part of the article considers what can be revealed by looking at tyranny, hegemony 
and anarchy in tandem. The Syrian civil war is extremely complicated with a multiplicity of 
legal explanations given for a variety of uses of force alongside political support and 
destabilisation by those located at the global core and within Syria’s geographic region. 
Decisions made at the core, for instance the US’ withdrawal of support for Kurdish troops 
alongside the Russia-Turkey settlement on the use of the military along the Turkish-Syrian 
border is yet another example of both the manipulation and side-lining of international law 
to suit particular circumstances within that civil war. The legal justifications for the array of 
uses of force in Syria are distinct and each in themselves reveal something different about 
tyranny, hegemony and anarchy. Anarchy offers an alternative to the hierarchies of 
international law and international relations which buttress hegemons and tyranny and 
establish a negative space for cooperation. Using hegemony as critique, rather than a realist 
view of power relations, highlights the inadequacies of the international legal order, and in 
particular the manipulation of the UN Charter Articles designed to prevent unlawful uses of 
force, especially by those granted special veto powers in the Security Council. Conceding 
tyrannical elements to the international order does not mean the system is absent positive 
aspects but it does require action to bring it to an end. The UN Charter’s use of force structure 
is neither fully hegemonic, nor anarchic, nor is it fully tyrannical, but in the bombing of Syria 
in April 2018 each form of governance is notable by its presence or absence. This article 
argues that each tells us something interesting about the international legal order but using 
all three as a pooled lens on a single event offers insights unavailable when they are used 
alone. 
The 2018 bombings and their aftermath reveal the exceptionalism that continues to 
surround the use of force particularly when it involves the Five Permanent members of the 
Security Council.152 Syria was ‘punished’ for violating international law and threatened by the 
US with reprisals; law is thus present, but only in part and only for some.153 This is law backed 
by force as Kant would recognise, but only those subject to hegemonic power suffer the 
consequences of their tyranny. Assad is punished for violating international law, however, 
despite evidence of Russian involvement in violating the laws of war, they have not been 
subject to similar repercussions nor have the states that have violated the UN Charters’ use 
of force Articles. Law’s presence offers protection only if the hegemonic powers put it into 
operation, it is partial and subject to the will of the power holders. Whether there is 
protection for Syrian civilians is subject to the ‘will’ of those possessing power and their 
decision to invoke law. At best, rule by law can be said to operate. But critically it is not chaos. 
Law reflects the hegemon and the possibility for tyranny, law is everywhere. It is not the 
freedom to that Waltz articulates, that freedom is only enjoyed by the hegemonic powers. 
Nor is it freedom from the overweening power of the hegemons. Rather it is a space where 
law cloaks illegitimate action by those with power, both within Syria by the Assad regime 
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and outside Syria by those intervening by force. Co-operative decision-making is absent 
except within the frame of the exercise of hegemonic power.  
Both tyranny and hegemony raise questions of where the benefits of a governance order lie. 
While the ultimate answer may be the same, that answer can be reached by different routes. 
Traditional hegemonic discourse considers hegemonic stability to benefit the entire 
governance order, but events in Syria demonstrate how people and places on the peripheries 
only see the ill effects of centrifugal forces. The US and Russia, alongside others including 
Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, attempt to project hegemonic power in the Middle East as a 
region in order to gather benefits, political, cultural and economic, to themselves. While their 
rationales for power projection will and do vary to suggest it is always altruistic would be to 
deny the outcomes of their interventions, which rarely benefit the individuals in the region.154 
As the Syrian example demonstrates, international law is either overtly invoked as a key 
instrument in attempting to gain those benefits, or efforts are made to divert its gaze. 
Tyranny raises the possibility of other beneficiaries. International law, while outlawing 
chemical weapons, a form of benefit to individuals within Syria, only empowers those states 
who wield power through the institutionalised and legitimate hierarchy of the Security 
Council to act against those that use them. But enough gaps exist to facilitate the illegitimate 
avenue of side-stepping that body’s scrutiny either to provide cover to an alley or because 
the state wishes to take steps on their own initiative or know that any investigatory steps will 
be blocked. Russia, the US, France and the UK all proportionately profit from the strength 
and weaknesses of these aspects of international law, all based in a system that they were 
fundamental to creating and sustaining.  
The UK based its arguments in humanitarian intervention, a doctrine which is entirely reliant 
on producing benefits within the territory that force is used.155 Yet, even Responsibility to 
Protect, as Libya demonstrates, does not appear to produce benefits for those living in the 
peripheral territory subject to states at the core’s beneficence through force.156 As the civil 
war in Syria continues, whether civilians have benefited from these airstrikes is at best, in 
doubt. Chemical weapons and other violations of the laws of war continue apace and few of 
the interventions appear to have benefited Syrians beyond the potential of reassertion of 
stability by the Assad regime through tyrannical governance and hegemony. The political s 
that three states involved in the airstrike both domestically and internationally is difficult to 
ascertain, particularly if damage was done, and this is uncertain, to their domestic and 
international legitimacy. Likewise, the benefits gained by Syria and Russia from posturing as 
the victims of airstrikes that ignored the lack of attribution evidence of their use or 
acquiescence to the use of chemical weapons appear weak. But all four intervening states 
assumed some advantage – political or strategic - would come from their interventions or 
contravention of the UN Charter, beyond any humanitarian relief or it is possible to argue 
they would not have intervened. The ultimate answer to who benefits in hegemony and 
tyranny may be the same, however both reveal different ways by which international law 
contributes to the accumulation of those advantages.  
Anarchy requires heterarchal decision-making, resistance and cooperation. It is only in the 
outlawing of chemical weapons in conjunction with international humanitarian law that the 
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individuals living in Syria become factors in international legal decision-making, not as 
decision-makers but rather as victims of tyrannical actions. They have no path to direct 
action, other than the possibility of tyrannicide against the Assad regime.157 A path that 
arguably they tried during the Arab Uprising of 2011. The structure of international law is 
such that beyond the renewed interest in recognising governments and the marginalised 
doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, there is little concern for domestic tyranny. Albeit the 
recent potential re-emergence of the recognition of governments in the case of Venezuela 
does suggest that this avenue may potentially return.158 Anarchy’s support of resistance, and 
tyranny’s corollary tyrannicide – which includes both non-violent and violent removal of 
tyranny – permits, and in some circumstances insists upon a duty to action against tyranny.159 
This would tend to lend itself to support for the overthrow of tyrannical governments by 
groups within a state, however the duty or ability lies with those subject to the tyranny so 
outside interference which foments a situation would still fall foul of Article 2.4 of the UN 
Charter. 
International law’s recognition of resistance is confined to specific forms within self-
determination, the Responsibility to Protect and international human rights law.160 This is 
unsurprising in a system, which as discussed earlier, contains tyrannical attributes and 
supports sovereignty but not democracy, and as such, overthrowing tyrannies is unlikely to 
be a priority.161 If these tyrannical attributes are combined with Bull’s anarchical order, then 
the international society thereby created might well establish some general beneficial 
elements, for instance, outlawing chemical weapons and creating a system of investigation 
and monitoring when violations occurred. The investigations into chemical weapons use in 
Syria in 2014 are an example of this in operation. This approach within the international legal 
order, rather than the specific body tasked within investigation, will prioritise easy wins over 
reducing the power of the tyrant. Setting up such bodies delays the attribution of fault and 
in cases of war, the circumstances have often long moved on. Albeit it is possible for ICC 
intervention, albeit in Syria this would be reliant on the UN Security Council and so is unlikely. 
International humanitarian law provides real substantive benefits which have prevented 
both the spread and use of chemical weapons. But this benefit is conceded while creating a 
broader Charter system where the jus ad bellum question is institutionalised to provide 
military hegemons, the permanent five Security Council members, with extensive power. It 
also allows those possessing overwhelming force to by-pass the legal system while punishing 
only the domestic tyrant for their actions. The lack of punishment does not mean there is no 
law, but points towards a tyrannical legal order. 
Hegemony is evident in the military engagement in April 2018. Its political and social forms 
also operate in the instrumentalisation of international law to facilitate the use of force. The 
nature of the force used, and especially the distance between those deploying force and 
those subject to it, bring the scale of global hegemony close to tyranny. Military hegemonic 
descriptions might be prominent within realist accounts of the international order, but these 
do not account for how law itself is a hegemonic force that creates a negative space for those 
unable to make use of its tenets. Legal hegemony is fundamental to a rule by law system 
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because it establishes legal domination as mundane and thus enabled the long extension of 
imperial era structures into the supposed era of sovereign equality. The reliance upon rule by 
law and imperial constructs within international law, principally by states that otherwise 
meet the standards of liberal constitutionalism, demonstrates how hegemony and tyranny 
align. The role of force as sanction, wielded by the small band of states able to employ 
overwhelming force, establishes that anarchy’s requirement of cooperation without the 




The bombing of Syria in April 2018 is but part of a broader failure of the international legal 
order. This catastrophe is palpable in events since the Arab Uprising but is evident in the long-
term abandonment of the Syrian population who have been subject to generations of 
tyrannical governance, including under the mandate system. The focus of this article upon 
the 2018 strikes is not intended to underplay the long-term suffering of those living in Syria 
and of the many Syrian refugees now globally dispersed. Rather, this event provides an 
opportunity to evaluate the actions of players within the international legal order. 
That hegemony, anarchy and tyranny are frequently employed in the domestic context is not 
necessarily problematic. Hegemony is always considered with domination amongst 
governance sites. Tyranny, since Aristotle, is disturbed by its application beyond the 
domestic. Anarchy, moreover, is co-opted to describe an international system where law is 
marginal or in its original form imagines governance without states. Seeing the three in 
tandem makes it easier to understand the emergence of tyrannical governance structures 
through hegemony. Hegemony is domination and precludes the rule of law, as such, both 
hegemonic stability and hegemonic legal evolution normalise its existence as inevitable and 
natural. The current international legal order and the hegemonic forces that created it 
become the natural standard and, in the main, are uncontested. Rule by law, the deployment 
or threat of force and the creation of a legal order which operates to the benefit of powerful 
groups become merely the normalised outcomes of hegemony, rather than symptoms of 
tyranny. Anarchism’s call for cooperation without force may be present in elements of the 
Charter and the corralling of war into its frame, however the Charter also reflects the mid-
20th Century hegemony behind its creation.  
It is possible to see international law in other ways. There is no inevitability to any legal 
construction and this paper would be different had it considered international human rights 
or economic law. Each could nonetheless be analysed via individual and collective 
deployment of tyranny, hegemony and anarchy theory. Engaging with substantive 
anarchism reveals the possibility of re-imagining a non-hierarchal, co-operative decision-
making space within international law. Recognising the tyrannical elements within 
international law, and using that as a point of reform, would be more valuable than 
conceding that international legal theory attempts to move beyond its historic roots in 19th 
Century imperialism, but has not yet achieved its task. Utilising tyranny requires admitting 
the inadequacies within international law and theory and then acting. Anarchy, tyranny and 
hegemonic critique forces international legal theory to acknowledge the extent to which the 
status quo causes harm and to move beyond tinkering with the peripheries as if they are the 
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problem. Using hegemony as a point of critique, not as a point of stability ignores harm at 
the peripheries and reveals the lack of substantive equality at the inter-state level.  
Hegemony’s deployment should be a point of critique that highlights the inadequacies of the 
international legal order in preventing the unlawful uses of force, rather than as an 
international realist acknowledgment of “the way things are”. Acknowledging that a system 
is tyrannical is not fatalistic; it produces a duty to bring that tyranny to an end. Looking to 
anarchism represents possibilities of what a truly cooperative international order, detached 
from domination or the force of sovereign force, might involve. 
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